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Financial Stability of Islamic and Conventional Banks in Saudi Arabia:  
Evidence using Pooled and Panel Models  
Hassan Belkacem Ghassan    and              Farid Bashir Taher 
ABSTRACT 
The financial crises are considered the major challenges facing the prosperity and stability of 
the banking system and menace its stability. Several studies on financial and banking sector 
have demonstrated that Islamic banks have shown more financial robustness and stability 
compared to conventional banks, over periods of financial crises. This research 
aims to measure the stability extent of the Saudi Arabia banks including Islamic banks 
and conventional banks using quarterly data from 2005 to 2011. This period is characterized 
by the global financial crisis shocks (2007-2008). The sample used is composed of six banks 
including two Islamic banks (AlRajhi Bank and AlBilad Bank) and four traditional banks 
(Riyad Bank, Saudi Investment Bank, Saudi British Bank and Saudi American Bank). This 
sample represents an important part of 64% of the Saudi banking sector and covers close to 
two thirds of banks whose shares are traded on the Saudi stock market. The research focuses 
on three types of variables related to bank, banking system and macroeconomic levels. The 
paper is based on quantitative tools using panel regression and pooled regression to model the 
z-score index for testing the banks stability in Saudi Arabia. The panel data model shows that 
Islamic banks reduce relatively the value of the financial stability index; meanwhile, they 
contribute efficiently to enhance the financial stability through the diversification of their 
assets. The findings indicate those Riyad Bank and SAMBA groups support efficiently the 
financial stability of banking sector, while AlRajhi bank has a positive but moderate role in 
enhancing the banking sector stability. The Saudi banking sector has relatively less level of 
competitiveness, that affecting negatively the financial stability. The limited representation of 
Islamic banks in the Saudi banking sector jeopardizes any efforts to improve the financial 
stability index.   
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I. Introduction 
Financial crises are strongly related to financial and banking systems, given the international 
financial liberalization market, where a local financial system is no longer isolated from 
changes of the global system. In the last decade of twentieth century Islamic banks were 
firstly established and had growing role in the international financial system since then. In 
fact, CIBAFI (2010) indicates that total world Islamic finance has reached around one trillion 
U.S. dollars at the end of 2009.  
During the last financial crisis (2007-2009) a large number of conventional banks around 
the world have announced bankruptcy (140 U.S. Banks in 2009)
1
; while no single Islamic 
bank failure has been reported. The logical question to be raised here, is whether Islamic 
banks are immunized against financial shocks? And if so, can this be explained by the free-
interest system, or by the fact that the Islamic banks do not invest in derivatives, “Tawaruq” 
and loans sale?
2
 (Chapra, 2000a, 2000b; Siddiqi, 2000; Hassan, 2006). In other word, can the 
immunity of Islamic banks against international financial crises be due to its incomplete 
integration in the global financial system? 
Studying the stability of Islamic banks requires the distinction between banks according to 
its asset structure in its budget. Firstly Islamic banks adopted single layer Mudarabah, where 
they mobilize their liabilities directly in different investment opportunities. This model was 
faced by a lot of operational risks. Accordingly, Islamic banks switched to the use of multi-
layers Mudarabah Islamic model, i.e., Mudarabah of assets (sources) and liabilities (uses), 
where all assets are financed through Profit Loss Sharing system (PLS). 
The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that Saudi Islamic banks are relatively 
less vulnerable to international financial crises, compared to Saudi conventional banks. The 
financial system and banking system in particular are always threatened by risks which lead 
to financial crises. Banking sector could be major driver of financial crises or one of channels 
transmitting the impacts of crises to other financial sectors and local or international real 
economies. Historical data shows that the banking sector was mostly the heavily damaged 
party by financial crises. During the last international financial crisis the banks losses in the 
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 http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30 
2
 The sale of loans is forbidden in Islam even if there are non interest loans.  
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world were estimated to be more than 1.8 trillion dollar, followed by insurance companies 
with around one trillion dollar. The importance of this paper stems from the perception that 
the stability of Saudi Islamic banks in responses to financial shocks, due to the adoption of 
the PLS system, is expected to contribute positively to the international financial stability. 
II. Nature of financial banks crises  
Since the financial crises of Latin-America and East Asia during the 1990s, international 
organizations have paid more attention to find out the causes and factors leading to the 
international financial crises. These efforts were conducted to elaborate an Early Warning 
System to expect the occurrence of future crises, to take precaution measures to reduce their 
damaging impacts.  
Although each financial crisis has its own features and causes, there are some common 
internal and external features and reasons for all crises. In light of previous studies, the main 
reason behind the possibility of financial crises is asymmetry of information available to 
different participants, concerning rigorous macroeconomic fluctuations, including term of 
trade changes, variability of world interest rates and incentives to the flow of funds, exchange 
rate changes, and the vast expansion of banks credit, followed by a sudden collapse of asset 
prices, causing a miss-match between banks liabilities and assets maturity. In addition, 
money supply was growing at faster rate than GDP. Moreover, financial crises were caused 
by excessive government interventions through banking sector regulation (conflicted 
objectives of government policy and interest groups in banking operations), and the weak 
accounting and legal systems concerning banks objectivity and comprehensive attitude 
toward exposure and dissemination of banks financial standing, as well as the inefficient 
monitoring and control of banks, concerning early corrective actions, and coordination 
between banks owners, managers, and investors, and concerned government agencies. 
Banks financial crises may also happen as a result of changes in exchange rates, through 
banks speculation in FOREX, or the unexpected deterioration of the value of its holding of 
real and financial assets. Central banks are willing, in such cases, to play its role as last resort 
to rescue insolvent banks and to prevent the occurrence of a banking system crisis. 
Accordingly, it is believed that the existence of one of more of the abovementioned factors 
definitely enhances the possibility of a banking sector crisis. An economy, under these 
circumstances, will not be able to accommodate or absorb financial shocks generated by the 
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instability of prices, interest rates and exchange rates. It would be difficult for the economy 
also to resist shocks of liquidity, credit and shocks related to changes in the structure of 
emerging financial institutions, as a result of reassessment of their financial assets, and 
changes in organizational structure or in the demand of assets. Therefore, several financial 
indices have been developed, such an early warning devices, to expect future financial shocks 
and to moderate its inverse financial and economic impacts.  
Banks receive loan applications form investors of different levels of risk and moral 
commitments toward financial deals with banks. Feasibility studies of investor’s project may 
help banks to assess the applicant level of risks, which consequently lessen adverse selection. 
However, such studies do not help bank to avoid moral hazards, which normally happen after 
signing the loan agreement. Furthermore, some loans may involve uncertainty concerning 
investors’ default intention. It is not an easy task for banks to accurately make the distinction 
between these level of risks caused by asymmetric information of banks and investors. 
Financial crises may be an exchange rate crisis, which leads to a large loss of the 
country international reserves, as a result mainly of the local currency devaluation. 
Another type of financial crises is that caused by bank failure, a situation that 
requires central bank interference to provide banks with reserves and to 
restructuring the banking system. Financial crises may also take place as a result of 
debt crisis, when debtors default on bank loans, or even when banks believe that 
defaults become a definite event. Facing such circumstances, banks are expected to 
adopt credit rationing strategy, depriving the economy from any new loans, settling 
outstanding loans. In some cases, the financial crisis may be related to the public 
debt, to Government failure in the repayment of the public debt, raising investment 
risk, discouraging foreign capital inflow, causing an exchange rate crisis. Facing 
such uncertainties, banks charge higher interest rates on loans by adding some risk 
allowance as an insurance premium. However, risky investors are the most likely to 
be willing to pay the high interest rates, given the high rates of returns expected on 
their projects. By contrast, low risk and moderate returns projects may turn to be 
infeasible, given the high financing cost. Accordingly, Banks will be forced to 
finance mainly risky projects, a practice known as adverse selection, which 
endanger the financial stability of the banking sector. 
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Moral hazards may also occur as a result of asymmetric information between banks and 
investors with respect to after contracting behavior of the later. Looking for highest possible 
profits, some investors violate the loan contract by utilizing funds received from banks in 
rather riskier projects than those agreed upon in the contract. Thus, moral hazards raise 
banks’ risk, increase interest on loans, and enhance adverse selection by banks, which all lead 
to inefficient allocation of financial resources and adverse impacts on the economy 
performance. 
III. Literature review 
There are few papers using quantitative models to analyze the financial stability of the 
Islamic and conventional banks. Čihak and Hesse (2010, 2008) analyze, via z-score as a 
criterion of stability, a sample of twenty countries extracted from the BankScope database, 
which contain the Islamic banks and conventional banks. The Islamic banks are classified 
into small and large banks following their assets-size with a threshold of one billion dollars 
and having at least 1% of the total assets of banks in the country. The findings of Čihak and 
Hesse indicate that small Islamic banks are more stable than small conventional banks and 
large Islamic banks, large conventional banks are more stable than large Islamic banks, and 
small Islamic banks are more stable than Islamic banks are large. They don’t show if the 
large conventional banks are less stable than small Islamic banks. 
The Islamic banks could be affected positively or negatively by financial crisis or banking 
crisis or bankruptcies of conventional banks even if the Islamic banks operate with its assets 
following the Islamic finance. So Standard & Poor's Credit Rating indicates that the Islamic 
financial institutions satisfy 15% of Muslims needs of financial services, and that the size of 
assets compatible to Islamic-Shariah reaches 400 billion dollars in 2009 i.e. approximately 
10% of international market, which is around 4 trillion dollars. The expansion of the Islamic 
finance model could reduce the immunity of Islamic banks. 
The paper of AlKholi (2009), by using several stability bank indexes, concludes that the 
Saudi Islamic and conventional banks have been supported by SAMA and reflect fragile 
stability. He shows that the Saudi banking sector has successfully absorbed the shocks of 
international financial crisis. This shock absorption increased the customers’ confidence and 
contributed to avoid a local financial crisis and its detrimental repercussion on real economy. 
Saudi banks reserves have been increased by more than three times to face the loan losses, 
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SAMA policy and credit rationing by banks reduce significantly the negative effects of the 
international financial crisis on Saudi banks. During the first nine months of 2009, the 
profitability of Saudi banks indicates a tenuous decline around 2.6% (18.86 billion Riyals in 
2009 versus 19.37 billion Riyals in 2008). At the same time, AlBilad Bank and Saud British 
bank recorded losses respectively at 66% and 11%; the losses of AlBilad Bank would be 
more related to local factors. 
Hasan & Dridi (2010) determine the effects of recent international financial crisis, 
especially during the period (2007-2008), on the conventional and Islamic banks in eight 
countries, including the GCC countries. Using a range of banking indicators such 
profitability, loan growth, asset growth and the external credit rating, they find that Islamic 
banks have been affected by the crisis, but in a different way comparatively to conventional 
banks. The Islamic banks profitability in 2008 reduces the negative impact of the 
international financial crisis. Also, the growth rate of credits and investments assets (loans 
granted in the PLS system) exhibit that the performance of Islamic banks is better than 
conventional banks, given the large losses incurred by conventional banks following the 
international financial crisis. Then, the Islamic banks contribute to realize the financial 
stability. However, the Islamic banks have some weaknesses related to their risk 
management. In that case, they are exposed to potential financial shocks, which require 
reliable financial instruments to resolve the risk management above all liquidity risk. 
The study of Imam and Kpodar (2010) identifies the factors affecting the world expansion 
of Islamic banks, which, in case of success, could be a new alternative financial model for 
finance industry. They use many factors affecting the international spread of Islamic banks 
such rate of Muslim population per country, technology of the domestic financial system, 
competitiveness of the domestic financial system, average of per capita income, real interest 
rate, events of September 11 2001, crude oil price, and integration degree to Middle East 
countries. The findings show that the average of per capita income and the competitiveness in 
the banking system have significant positive impacts on the spread of Islamic banks, 
expressing the increasing need for Islamic financial intermediation across the world. Also, the 
decrease in real interest rates less than 3.5% conducts to more deposits in the Islamic banks. 
The paper of Ariss (2010) focuses on competitiveness conditions of Islamic and conventional 
banks by using several indicators such PR H-statistic index and Lerner index (market power 
of bank). Using yearly data from 2000 to 2006, the findings indicate that the weakness 
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competitiveness is related significantly and positively to higher level of profitability, and that 
traditional banks are more competitive than the Islamic banks. Quasi all research uses annual 
data; our paper by using quarterly data contributes to enrich the previous research modeling 
the financial stability of banks in face of shocks due to financial crises. The panel data 
features are firstly that the sample from 2005 to 2011 represents an important part of 64% of 
the Saudi banking sector with Islamic and conventional banks and covers close to two thirds 
of banks whose shares are traded on the Saudi stock market, and secondly that the sample 
contains the events of the recent global financial crisis (2007-2009). 
IV. Banks Data and tests 
Saudi banking system is composed of a total of eleven banks, including two distinguished 
groups, Islamic and conventional banks (Table 1 and Table 2). Four banks were classified as 
Islamic banks, according to the non-interest financing practice of this group of banks.
1
 The 
rest seven banks are conventional banks. For the purpose of this paper, a sample of six banks 
were selected, two Islamic banks (AlRajhi and AlBilad banks), and four conventional banks 
(Riyad bank, Saudi Investment bank, Saud British bank, and Saudi American bank), where 
the last two represent offshore banks, with its close links to international banks around the 
world that allow the investigation of the international financial crisis impacts on these banks 
and on the Saudi financial system (see appendix 8.1: panel definitions).  
The stability index (z-score) in sub-annual level is calculated using quarterly data 
collected and constructed from the Saudi financial market “Tadawul” over the period 2005-
2011.
3
 The last financial crisis has revealed some weaknesses of the Saudi banking system, 
on top of which are: first, the high concentration of bank loans to a limited number of firms 
and individuals. Second, the large portion of banks’ investment in foreign assets with 
relatively high rates of returns compared to interest rates on domestic assets, especially after 
lowering the reverse repo by SAMA, and the lack of new government bonds during the same 
period, and the resulted liquidity surplus, which were channeled to the international markets 
(Ghassan et al., 2011).  
The world financial crisis has caused some Saudi banks to encore losses, particularly those 
involved in foreign investment, loans trade, speculation in foreign currency and gold markets, 
and financial derivatives deals. Third, banks showed some degree of credit rationing and 
                                                           
3 The international database BankScope allows only annual financial data.  
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become relatively more conservative in issuing new loans. On the other hand, Saudi banking 
sector have shown some healthy signs during the financial crisis, where its record 
profitability levels were maintained. Net banks’ profits were declined only by approximately 
2.6% after the conservative measures taken by banks. Total reserves, voluntarily, boosted to 
6.04 billion Riyals, over the period January to September 2009, compared with 1.58 billion 
Riyals a year before, as a precautionary action to meet any possible losses due to investors’ 
defaults on banks’ loans. It was also noticed that equity capital of Saudi banks have 
increased, and banks’ assets have not suffered the drastic negative impacts that hit banks’ 
sectors in industrial countries around the world, where some giant famous banks were forced 
to announce bankruptcy. Saudi banks’ huge reserves, most likely have shielded domestic 
banks against the tremendous negative impacts of international financial crisis. Moreover, 
some well-known international credit rating agencies as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, has 
reported that basic financial forecasts of the Saudi banking sector are relatively stable, 
flexible and had the ability to absorb negative shocks of the international financial crisis and 
the declining world economic growth.   
The prior step is to implement the panel unit root test on the relevant variables given in 
equation (x) below (Descriptive statistics, Tables 3).
2
 A widely used panel unit root tests are 
Hadri (1999) as a common root test and Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 2003) as an individual 
root test. The Hadri test considers the null hypothesis of no unit root and assumes that 
persistence parameters are common i.e. identical in the panel data. Accordingly, it assumes a 
common process of the panel unit root under null hypothesis  considering a 
following process for panel data  where is the specific-individual error, 
 stands for a time-trend which is related to fixed or individual effects. Similarly to KPSS 
test, this test depends on the residuals from the individual OLS regressions on constant and 
time-trend. The statistic LM1 is formed allowing for homoscedasticity hypothesis and 
alternatively the statistic ML2 is related to consistent heteroscedasticity assumption, which 
leads to -statistic values (Table 4.2). The IPS test considers the null hypothesis of unit root 
and supposes that the persistent coefficient may vary between banks. Accordingly, it assumes 
an individual process of the panel unit root under null hypothesis  and 
considering a following individual ADF regression for each bank 
. The average of the t-statistics of  from the 
individual ADF regressions is adjusted to calculate  statistics. When the lag order is 
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non-zero for some cross-sections, the IPS test shows that a properly standardized  i.e. 
statistic fellows asymptotically a standard normal distribution (Table 4.1). The results of 
unit root panel test indicate that banks’ variables have unit root using either IPS or Hadri test. 
This finding suggests that the bank’s variables would be cointegrated. Also, the results of unit 
root tests exhibit that banking sector and macroeconomic variables are no stationary except 
the economic growth variable. 
V. Stability index Model 
5.1 Banks Financial Stability Measurement 
There are several well-known methods measuring the stability of financial systems, and 
banking sector in particular. Among these methods, Value at Risk (VaR) (Holton, 2003, 
Manganelli & Engle, 2001), Stress Test (Aragonés et al., 2001; BIS, 2000) and z-score model 
(Altman, 1983). This model is considered the best amongst all other methods, as it has the 
advantage of predicting the possibilities of future bank insolvency, while other methods just 
find out if the bank may faces a liquidity problem.   
In fact, insolvency is more serious and dangerous problem than liquidity, which means 
that the bank liabilities exceed its assets, or the bank become insolvent. A bank may become 
illiquid even when it is solvent, if its assets are held in illiquid assets (long term financial 
assets or real assets) that can only be liquidated at high cost. The bank may be forced to sell 
such assets at considerable loss, by selling it at lower than its nominal value. 
Altman measure can be applied to conventional and Islamic banks as well, using banks’ 
accounting data. The z-score for banks takes the following definitions: 
                                                                                                                            (1) 
                                      (2) 
where  is the ratio of equity capital plus total reserves to assets.  represents the ratio of 
average returns to assets, where average returns are calculated on base of four observations 
per year; we use the first formula.  stands for the standard deviation of returns to assets, and 
measures the volatility of returns on assets.
3
 The z-score bank’s stability index is used for 
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predicting financial distress. It is based on a standard indicator of financial soundness of a 
group of different financial institutions, and focuses on bank’s risk of insolvency.4 The z-
score reflects the probability of insolvency or bank liabilities exceed assets. Assuming a 
normally distributed bank return , then the probability of default is 
. The z-score measures the number of standard deviations that a 
return realization has to fall in order to deplete equity (Čihak, 2007). The greater z-score 
indicates the lower likelihood of bank insolvency risk; the index will take high value when 
capitalization, measured in terms of risk error, is large.  
The z-score seems to be appropriate to measure the Islamic bank risk, because it is not 
affected by the nature of the bank activities; but it focuses on risks involved in the investment 
of bank assets and reserves. It is specially suitable for banks adopting investment strategies 
that prefer high risk assets given a high rate of return, or low risk assets even at low rate of 
returns, which guarantees the z-score objectivity (Čihak & Hesse, 2010, 2008; Maechler et 
al., 2005). But in the context of financial shocks and crises the high risk may lead to meager 
or negative returns, whilst the small risks may turn to big returns. These volatilities require a 
specific modeling of z-score index to explain its determinants in the long run such the 
GARCH models.  
The z-score index may be incompatible with the nature of Islamic banking relying mainly 
on the PLS system, which leads to a common risk of the investor and bank via “Mudarabah” 
and “Musharakah” contracts. It is probable that the capital value and reserves do not reflect 
the financial strength of Islamic banks, because the investor shall bear a part of the risk 
according to a formula of PLS contracts, and thus reduce fairly the risk of Islamic Banks. 
These banks may seek for adjustments processes in risk-taking rates by the investors through 
appropriate contracts of PLS system and new methods of capital investment. The 
conventional banks also seek for adjustment processes of interest rates on deposits and loans 
to avoid insolvency (Čihak & Hesse, 2010, 2008). 
5.2 Financial Stability Model 
The financial stability index is influenced by three sets of variables related to banks, banking 
sector and macroeconomic, respectively. The bank determinants include five variables: 
logarithm of z-score (LZSCOR), logarithm of total assets (LAST), loans to assets ratio for 
conventional banks or ratio of finance activity to assets in case of Islamic banks (ratio of 
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credits to assets, RCA),
5
 in addition to ratio of operating costs to income (RCI) and income 
diversity (IDV).  6 The banking sector determinants include three variables: logarithm of 
Herfindahl index (LHHI), which measures banks’ competitiveness, that ranges between zero 
for highly competitive and 10000 for a least competitive market (Ariss, 2010). It also 
includes the share of Islamic banks i.e. ratio of Islamic banks’ assets to total assets of the 
banking sector (SHIB), which may also be measured by the ratio of Islamic banks’ deposits 
to total bank sector deposits. The macro variables are both real rate of economic growth 
(GRW) and rate of inflation (INF).   
To capture the impacts of a specific bank on financial banking stability, two bank dummy 
variables were introduced one for conventional banks (CBD) and the other for Islamic banks 
(IBD). These variables are expected to take on a negative sign indicating the financial 
weakness of the related bank group, whereas a positive sign reflecting the financial strength 
of the related bank group and its contribution to the banking sector stability. It is also possible 
to use a composed variable in testing the hypothesis that the Islamic banks contribute to the 
financial stability of banking sector. The IDV variable interacts with both dummy variables 
IBD and CBD. If the interaction with IBD takes on a positive sign, it implies that the 
diversity of Islamic bank’s income enhances the stability of the banking sector. 
Given that the cross-section observations are less than the time series observations 
, and assuming the existence of serial correlation between banks’ data, the 
unobserved random errors are expected to have variance covariance matrix , with 
, where  is not necessarily equal zero (Heij et al. 2004). These 
features require using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model, which leads to 
formulate a pooled data model and use of several estimation techniques of z-score model.
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Based on the previous determinants of financial stability, the z-score model could be 
written as follows:   
                                                        (3) 
where  stands for banks variables,  and  represent banking sector and 
macroeconomic variables, respectively. We use also  as dummy variable to exhibit to 
distinguish between the impacts of conventional and Islamic banks on the financial distress 
on bank . The term  indicates the unobserved stochastic errors. The variables in right side 
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of Eq. (3) are considered with one lag length to capture their effects on the expected z-score 
index.   
Considering that the sum of cross fixed effects is zero (bottom of Tables 5), these effects 
appear in Figures 3 and represent the deviations from the global rate of z-score. The findings 
show that SIB, SAB banks and mainly BLD bank contribute positively to financial stability, 
whereas SAM and RJH banks and mostly RYD bank contribute negatively to financial index 
stability. To exhibit the global effect on banking sector, we formulate a Panel data model and 
using also numerous estimation methods:
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                                                                  (4) 
The findings indicate that Islamic banks reduce the financial stability index in the average 
rate of 11.4% (Table 7.1). But they contribute to the financial stability in banking sector 
through the income diversity index, which improves the z-score on average at rate 21.6%. 
The serial correlation due to the dummy variable (IBD) relativizes these results.      
The results of the Table 7.3 have some goodness statistical features, they show that 
Islamic banks contribute to improving financial stability in average with rate of 8.3% (i.e. 
) through the diversification of financial products. The results of Table 8.2 from Panel 
GLS estimation indicate that fixed cross effects on z-score vary between banks. AlBilad bank 
contributes negatively to z-score more than SAIB and in particular comparatively to the 
negative contribution of SABB (1.5% on average). Meanwhile Riyad Bank contributes 
efficiently to banking financial stability, SAMBA group enhances this stability significantly, 
and AlRajhi Bank has a slightly positive contribution (1.1% on average). 
The Table 7.3 indicates that the index of operating cost to income has almost neutral role 
in improving the financial stability index, so it is reduced slightly at rate 0.01%. But, AlBilad 
bank has a high and unstable ratio of cost to income, while AlRajhi Bank proved to be highly 
competitive over to Riyad Bank. This ratio appears to be more unstable and less competitive 
in both SAIB and SABB. It appears from Table 7.3 that the variables of banks have the 
expected signs, as the banks that have a high level of RCA variable moves toward low index 
of financial stability (Table 8.2), such as AlBilad Bank in particular and SAIB. But, it seems 
that the marginal propensity (0.622) associated to the ratio of loans to assets (for conventional 
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banks) or to the ratio of finance to assets (for Islamic banks) has a significant positive sign, 
which emphasizes the effects of banks with moderate RCA ratios.  
The modest presence of Islamic banks in the Saudi banking sector does not qualify them 
to improve effectively the banking financial stability. The dominance of conventional banks 
reflects that they contribute to increase the z-score index, although some financial distress as 
in SAIB and SABB. But, the presence of Islamic banks leads to net improvement of the 
financial stability, so that the fixed cross effects (Table 5.3) exhibit that AlBilad bank, with 
small size compared to AlRajhi Bank, gets better the z-score index, while AlRajhi bank tends 
to reduce the Islamic financial stability index. These results may be explained by the 
involvement of AlRajhi bank, through the Profit-Loss Sharing system, in direct investment 
operations or long run and high risk financial investment intermediation. These results are 
similar in part to the findings of Čihak and Hesse (2010, 2008), that the small Islamic banks 
are more stable than the large ones. 
It seems that the impact of competitive banks index LHHI has a negative sign and high 
significant parameter, which indicates that the Saudi banking sector relatively complains of 
weak competition, reflecting negative effects on financial stability. In addition, the estimated 
equations exhibit that the inflation rate affects negatively and significantly the z-score index, 
which illustrates the importance of economic and financial policies of the government in 
support of the financial stability in banking system.  
VI. Conclusion  
The paper uses the z-score as financial distress index of sample of Saudi banks including 
conventional and Islamic banks. The financial stability model is explained by variables 
reliable to individual banks, banking sector and macroeconomic. The models are designed for 
both pooled and panel data and estimated by several methods, the findings may be 
summarized as follows.  
Pooled data model shows that SAIB and SABB and mainly AlBilad bank contribute 
positively to its financial stability index, while SAMBA group, AlRajhi Bank and in 
particular Riyad bank have a negative impact on its financial stability index. However, panel 
data model shows that Islamic banks reduce relatively the value of the financial stability 
index; meanwhile, they contribute efficiently to enhance the financial stability through the 
diversification of their assets. The fixed cross effects on z-score indicate that AlBilad Bank 
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had the greatest negative contribution to the financial stability index, followed by SAIB and 
the SABB, this latter has the least negative impact on z-score. Results also show that Riyad 
Bank and SAMBA group efficiently support the financial stability of banking sector, while 
AlRajhi bank has a positive but relatively moderate role in enhancing the banking sector 
stability.   
The findings indicate that the ratio of operating cost to income has almost neutral role in 
improving the financial stability index. AlBilad Bank has a high and unstable ratio of cost to 
income, while AlRajhi Bank proved to be highly competitive over to Riyad Bank. This ratio 
appears to be more unstable and less competitive in both SAIB and SABB. Conventional 
banks with high ratio of loans to assets or Islamic banks with high finance to assets ratio 
mostly have lower stability indices, as for instance AlBilad bank and SAIB. However, this 
ratio has a positive and significant marginal propensity, which emphasizes the effects of 
banks with moderate ratios. The competitiveness index seems to be negatively high and 
strongly significant, which indicates that the Saudi banking sector has relatively less level of 
competitiveness, that negatively affecting the financial stability. The limited representation of 
Islamic banks in the Saudi banking sector jeopardizes any efforts to improve the financial 
stability index. 
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Annex 
1. Banks identity  
Riyad Bank (RYD) is a Saudi Joint Stock Company founded in 1957. It operates with 237 
branches, a branch in London (UK), and an agency in Houston (USA) and a representative 
office in Singapore. The RYD provides a full range of banking and investment services. It 
also provides to its customers non-interest based banking products approved and supervised 
by an independent Shariah Board established by RYD. 
Saudi Investment Bank, SAIB (SIB) founded in 1976 and owned by the government. It 
operates with 45 branches, which 41 work under the Alasalah Brand. SAIB provides a full 
range of traditional wholesale, retail and commercial banking products and services in 
particular for the quasi-government and private industrial sectors including trade finance 
products for both imports and exports. Through Alasalah Islamic Banking brand, SAIB offers 
several Shariah-compliant products and services.  
Saudi British Bank, SABB (SAB) is a Saudi Joint-Stock company founded in 1978 and 
licensed to conduct banking business. SABB has a very strong and rich record in banking 
business as well as a successful history in Saudi Arabia in the launch and provision of 
banking services and products for retail and corporate customers. SABB is one of the first 
banks to issue the credit cards in the Saudi Market, use ATMs for equity subscription 
services, in addition to the use of Braille language in ATMs and the financing and support of 
MBA scholarship program at UK universities for Saudi citizens.  
Samba Financial Group (SAMBA, SAM) founded in 1980 and enjoys an extensive 
network of branches in Saudi Arabia as well as in UK, Pakistan and Dubai. The SAMBA 
adopts a strategy of expansion in the regional markets and provides world class services to 
meet the financial needs of its private, corporate and institutional customers. Its strong suite 
of comprehensive and integrated conventional and Shariah-compliant financial products and 
services as well as financial advisory services has propelled Samba to the top tier of Saudi 
Financial institutions. The Bank aims to invest in its staff, reinforce its social responsibility 
and maximize its shareholders returns. SAMBA was the first Bank in Saudi Arabia to offer 
Priority Banking (Gold and Diamond), Phone Banking, ATMs and Cash Deposit through 
ATMs, Debit Cards, Charge Cards, Islamic Credit Cards, Co-Branded Credit Cards, AlKhair 
Credit Cards for ladies, “Murabaha”-Based Cash Financing, Phone Banking, Leasing 
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(“Ijarah”), Foreign Exchange Derivatives, Interest Rate Derivatives, Credit Shield Insurance, 
and Automated Signature Verification.  
AlRajhi Bank (RJH) founded in 1976 and considered as one of the largest banking 
corporations in Saudi Arabia with a Saudi fully paid capital. RJH has the largest branch 
network (more than 500 branches) and the largest (ATM) network (2000 machines) and over 
17,000 (POS) installed with merchants all over the Kingdom. The objectives of RJH are 
represented in practicing banking and investment activities respecting Islamic law. RJH is 
practicing banking and investment (individuals, companies) for its own account or on behalf 
of others within and outside the Kingdom. 
AlBilad Bank (BLD) is a Saudi joint stock company founded in 2005. The objectives of 
BLD are to provide all Islamic Shariah compliant banking services. The bank has, as part of 
its organizational structure, Shariah Department to be in charge of the follow-up and 
monitoring of the implementation of the Shariah decisions issued by the Shariah Committee.  
 
2. Tables and Figures 
 Table 1: Banks Listed in the Saudi Stock Exchange (2012) 
  Source: http://www.tadawul.com.sa (2012). IW stands for Islamic windows. 
 
      
   
Bank Code Bank type Capital (Billion SAR) 
1. Riyad Bank RYD Conventional with IW 0..1 
2. Al-Jazirah JZR Islamic 1..1 
3. Saudi Investment Bank SIB Conventional with IW 1... 
4. Saudi Hollandi Bank SHD Conventional 1... 
5. Saudi Fransi Bank SAF Conventional with IW 1..0 
6. Saudi British Bank (SABB) SAB Conventional with IW 1... 
7. Arab National ARN Conventional with IW 1... 
8. Saudi American Bank (SAMBA) SAM Conventional with IW 1..1 
9. AlRajhi Bank RJH Islamic 0..1 
10. AlBilad Bank BLD Islamic 1..1 
11. AlInma Bank IMA Islamic 0..1 
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     Table 2: Main Differences between Islamic and Conventional Banks 
 Conventional Banks  Islamic Banks  
Model 
Based on conventional law, 
Maximize profits subject to 
differential interest rates. 
Based on Islamic law (Shariah), 
Maximize profits subject to Profit-Loss 
Sharing (PLS) System. 
Risk 
 Shifting risk when involved or 
expected. 
 Guarantee all its deposits. 
 Focus on credit-worthiness of the 
clients. 
 
 
 Bearing risks when involved in any 
transaction. 
 Guarantee only current account 
deposits, but other deposits are 
invested via multilayer Mudarabah 
system as a part of PLS system. 
 Focus on the viability of the 
projects. 
Money and 
liquidity 
 Interests on borrowing from the 
any market.  
 Sale of Debts. 
 Based on Shariah-compliant for any 
transaction.  
 Large restrictions on sale of Debts. 
 
 
      Figures 1: Banks data 
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           Figures 1: Banks data (Cont. 1)  
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            Figures 1: Banks data (Cont. 2)  
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                                Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for LZSCOR 
CROSSID Mean Quant.* Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt. 
SAM_1 3.848 3.872 0.088 -0.588 2.122 
RYD_2 4.107 4.070 0.155 -0.025 2.482 
SAB_3 3.511 3.518 0.120 -0.333 2.129 
SIB_4 3.340 3.348 0.078 -0.272 2.292 
RJH_5 3.928 3.935 0.106 -0.393 2.637 
BLD_6 3.717 3.586 0.260 0.271 1.433 
All 3.742 3.797 0.296 -0.039 1.937 
 
 
 
 
 
                          Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for LAST 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                     
                                    
 
 
 
                       Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics for RCA 
CROSSID Mean Median Quant.* Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt. 
SAM_1 0.533 0.538 0.538 0.036 -0.566 2.829 
RYD_2 0.566 0.567 0.568 0.041 -0.969 4.065 
SAB_3 0.591 0.600 0.600 0.037 -0.301 1.719 
SIB_4 0.524 0.517 0.517 0.046 0.370 2.118 
RJH_5 0.862 0.869 0.869 0.015 -0.791 2.475 
BLD_6 0.809 0.874 0.874 0.104 -0.937 2.300 
All 0.647 0.596 0.596 0.146 0.663 1.843 
 
 
  
                                   
 
                         Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics for RCI 
CROSSID Mean Median Quant.* Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt. 
SAM_1 0.484 0.451 0.451 0.184 2.123 7.829 
RYD_2 0.868 0.735 0.735 0.453 2.260 7.207 
SAB_3 2.914 0.689 0.689 9.944 4.126 18.036 
SIB_4 -0.552 0.412 0.412 3.427 -1.663 5.249 
RJH_5 0.499 0.472 0.472 0.189 0.554 2.386 
BLD_6 14.619 3.212 3.213 39.916 2.683 8.498 
All 3.139 0.574 0.574 17.314 6.993 52.995 
 
 
 
 
 
CROSSID Mean Median Quant.* Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt. 
SAM_1 11.858 11.816 11.816 0.226 0.019 1.330 
RYD_2 11.640 11.531 11.531 0.305 0.237 1.486 
SAB_3 11.426 11.377 11.377 0.289 -0.008 1.550 
SIB_4 10.683 10.678 10.678 0.155 -0.229 1.950 
RJH_5 11.721 11.734 11.734 0.249 -0.061 1.544 
BLD_6 9.434 9.638 9.638 0.319 -0.459 1.574 
All 11.127 11.428 11.428 0.889 -1.033 3.005 
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                  Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics for IDV 
CROSSID Mean Median Quant.* Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt. 
SAM_1 0.667 0.640 0.640 0.159 0.208 1.802 
RYD_2 0.668 0.690 0.690 0.149 -0.440 2.584 
SAB_3 0.725 0.711 0.711 0.132 0.410 1.904 
SIB_4 0.717 0.701 0.701 0.192 -0.498 2.597 
RJH_5 0.441 0.412 0.412 0.115 0.304 2.356 
BLD_6 0.709 0.719 0.719 0.086 -0.682 3.706 
All 0.655 0.684 0.684 0.171 -0.236 2.464 
  *Quantiles computed for p=0.5, using the Rankit (Cleveland) definition. 
 
 
 
 Table 4.1: Panel unit root 
IDV RCI RCA LAST LZSCOR  
IE, IT IE IE IE, IT IE Model 
-0.866 
(0.19) 
-0.398 
(0.34) 
-0.636 
(0.26) 
-0.773 
(0.22) 
-0.506 
(0.31) 
IPS_W-stat 
(Prob.-value) 
    -1.713 
(-2.42) 
IPS_  -stat 
(Critical-value) 
NS NS NS NS NS Decision 
 
 
 
 
                                                   Table 4.2: Panel unit root 
IDV RCI RCA LAST LZSCOR  
IE IE, IT IE, IT IE, IT IE, IT Model 
4.020 
(0.0000) 
3.065 
(0.001) 
4.064 
(0.0000) 
2.817 
(0.002) 
2.968 
(0.0015) 
Hadri_Z-stat 
(Prob.-value) 
3.436 
(0.0003) 
23.982 
(0.0000) 
3.312 
(0.0005) 
2.190 
(0.014) 
2.978 
(0.0015) 
Hadri_HC_Z-stat 
(Prob.-value) 
NS NS NS NS NS Decision 
                                    Note: IE, IT and NS are Individual Effects, Individual linear Trends  
                                               and Non Stationarity, respectively. 
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                   Table 5.1:  PLS Estimation of z-score model  
Dependent Variable: LZSCOR?   
Method: Pooled Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 2005Q2 2009Q4  
Included observations: 19 after adjustments  
Cross-sections included: 6   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 114  
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     C 405.1239 203.9526 1.986363 0.0504 
LHHI(-1) -43.80782 22.32002 -1.962714 0.0531 
SHIB(-1) -67.78258 35.22877 -1.924069 0.0579 
INF(-1) -1.925408 1.407210 -1.368245 0.1750 
LAST_SAM(-1) -0.094274 0.149309 -0.631402 0.5296 
LAST_RYD(-1) 0.312758 0.119997 2.606377 0.0109 
LAST_SAB(-1) -0.278381 0.118287 -2.353433 0.0210 
LAST_SIB(-1) -0.230379 0.224252 -1.027321 0.3073 
LAST_RJH(-1) 0.208745 0.134581 1.551069 0.1248 
LAST_BLD(-1) -0.733271 0.106329 -6.896225 0.0000 
RCA_SAM(-1) 0.063777 1.051747 0.060639 0.9518 
RCA_RYD(-1) -1.530371 0.708819 -2.159045 0.0338 
RCA_SAB(-1) -1.239895 0.781145 -1.587280 0.1163 
RCA_SIB(-1) -0.216678 0.644141 -0.336383 0.7375 
RCA_RJH(-1) 0.439917 1.524202 0.288622 0.7736 
RCA_BLD(-1) 0.113864 0.293848 0.387494 0.6994 
RCI_SAM(-1) 0.016033 0.140548 0.114074 0.9095 
RCI_RYD(-1) 0.014514 0.051751 0.280460 0.7798 
RCI_SAB(-1) 0.122248 0.132076 0.925589 0.3574 
RCI_SIB(-1) -0.001828 0.006708 -0.272476 0.7859 
RCI_RJH(-1) -0.425608 0.177456 -2.398382 0.0188 
RCI_BLD(-1) -0.000197 0.000519 -0.379905 0.7050 
IDV_SAM(-1) 0.060295 0.231529 0.260421 0.7952 
IDV_RYD(-1) -0.318230 0.128661 -2.473408 0.0155 
IDV_SAB(-1) 0.006919 0.189774 0.036459 0.9710 
IDV_SIB(-1) -0.121753 0.133137 -0.914493 0.3632 
IDV_RJH(-1) -0.192515 0.247283 -0.778520 0.4385 
IDV_BLD(-1) 0.175048 0.283271 0.617953 0.5383 
 
Fixed Effects (Cross)     
C_SAM -0.369695    
C_RYD -3.724646    
C_SAB 2.067986    
C_SIB 0.743502    
C_RJH -3.853596    
C_BLD 5.136448    
      Effects Specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     R-squared 0.938639     Mean dependent var 3.745184 
Adjusted R-squared 0.914398     S.D. dependent var 0.296972 
S.E. of regression 0.086887     Akaike info criterion -1.811212 
Sum squared resid 0.611502     Schwarz criterion -1.019154 
Log likelihood 136.2391     F-statistic 38.72080 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.668614     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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         Figures 2.1: PLS Residuals of z-score model 
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                    Table 6.1: Residual Correlation Matrix by  
                                      Method Polled Least Square (PLS) 
 _SAM _RYD _SAB _SIB _RJH _BLD 
_SAM 1.00000 0.01517 0.34024 0.65589 0.46101 -0.28884 
_RYD 0.01517 1.00000 -0.13244 -0.37964 -0.34416 0.38974 
_SAB 0.34024 -0.13244 1.00000 0.42124 -0.08388 0.07482 
_SIB 0.65589 -0.37964 0.42124 1.00000 0.53043 -0.36510 
_RJH 0.46101 -0.34416 -0.08388 0.53043 1.00000 -0.31687 
_BLD -0.28884 0.38974 0.07482 -0.36510 -0.31687 1.00000 
 
 
                         Figures3.1: Panel Fixed Effects using Pooled LS method  
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                     Table 5.2:  SUR Estimation of z-score model 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LZSCOR?   
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Sample (adjusted): 2005Q2 2009Q4  
Included observations: 19 after adjustments  
Cross-sections included: 6   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 114  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Cross-section SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 512.7458 167.3986 3.063024 0.0030 
LHHI(-1) -55.55613 18.31874 -3.032749 0.0033 
SHIB(-1) -85.82698 28.84727 -2.975220 0.0039 
INF(-1) -1.679285 1.091305 -1.538785 0.1278 
LAST_SAM(-1) -0.143673 0.102186 -1.405997 0.1635 
LAST_RYD(-1) 0.322746 0.154840 2.084381 0.0403 
LAST_SAB(-1) -0.291123 0.074556 -3.904783 0.0002 
LAST_SIB(-1) -0.350277 0.109368 -3.202732 0.0019 
LAST_RJH(-1) 0.134816 0.089057 1.513818 0.1340 
LAST_BLD(-1) -0.678814 0.108381 -6.263192 0.0000 
RCA_SAM(-1) -0.064091 0.524942 -0.122092 0.9031 
RCA_RYD(-1) -0.825364 0.834539 -0.989007 0.3256 
RCA_SAB(-1) -1.193274 0.419681 -2.843285 0.0056 
RCA_SIB(-1) -0.038035 0.234873 -0.161939 0.8718 
RCA_RJH(-1) -0.494111 0.749974 -0.658838 0.5119 
RCA_BLD(-1) 0.234958 0.306650 0.766208 0.4458 
RCI_SAM(-1) 0.025329 0.074892 0.338212 0.7361 
RCI_RYD(-1) -0.024915 0.061139 -0.407510 0.6847 
RCI_SAB(-1) 0.083421 0.074610 1.118082 0.2668 
RCI_SIB(-1) -0.001503 0.002528 -0.594355 0.5539 
RCI_RJH(-1) -0.419420 0.092544 -4.532120 0.0000 
RCI_BLD(-1) 0.000132 0.000525 0.252480 0.8013 
IDV_SAM(-1) 0.057392 0.118545 0.484131 0.6296 
IDV_RYD(-1) -0.195442 0.150313 -1.300231 0.1972 
IDV_SAB(-1) -0.032188 0.110290 -0.291852 0.7711 
IDV_SIB(-1) -0.141041 0.047969 -2.940231 0.0043 
IDV_RJH(-1) -0.229842 0.128011 -1.795482 0.0763 
IDV_BLD(-1) 0.115193 0.292878 0.393316 0.6951 
 
Fixed Effects (Cross)     
C_SAM -0.147685    
C_RYD -4.712625    
C_SAB 1.812095    
C _SIB 1.515250    
C_RJH -2.599788    
C_BLD 4.132753    
     
 Effects Specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted Statistics   
     
R-squared 0.995868     Mean dependent var 54.01909 
Adjusted R-squared 0.994235     S.D. dependent var 14.88958 
S.E. of regression 1.130498     Sum squared resid 103.5201 
F-statistic 610.0356     Durbin-Watson stat 1.912531 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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          Figures 2.2: SUR Residuals of z-score model 
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                    Table 6.2: Residual Correlation Matrix by  
                                      Method Polled EGLS (SUR) 
 _SAM _RYD _SAB _SIB _RJH _BLD 
_SAM 1.00000 -0.04561 0.39510 0.63394 0.59119 -0.25499 
_RYD -0.04561 1.00000 -0.15344 -0.55856 -0.42063 0.53889 
_SAB 0.39510 -0.15344 1.00000 0.42006 -0.04031 0.12961 
_SIB 0.63394 -0.55856 0.42006 1.00000 0.64462 -0.46587 
_RJH 0.59119 -0.42063 -0.04031 0.64462 1.00000 -0.44098 
_BLD -0.25499 0.53889 0.12961 -0.46587 -0.44098 1.00000 
 
 
                            Figures3.2: Panel Fixed Effects using SUR method 
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                           Table 5.3: Double GLS-SUR Estimation of z-score model 
Dependent Variable: LZSCOR?   
Method: Pooled IV/Two-stage EGLS (Cross-section SUR) 
Sample (adjusted): 2005Q2 2009Q4  
Included observations: 19 after adjustments  
Cross-sections included: 6   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 114  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Instrument list: c lhhi(-1) shib(-1) inf(-1)  @cxinst last?(-1) rca?(-1)rci?(-
1) idv?(-1) idv_ibd?(-1) 
Cross-section SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     C 11.44979 3.608446 3.173053 0.0021 
LHHI(-1) -0.697518 0.400972 -1.739566 0.0857 
SHIB(-1) 0.338608 1.026395 0.329900 0.7423 
INF(-1) -0.514414 1.170320 -0.439550 0.6614 
LAST_SAM(-1) -0.089445 0.108586 -0.823731 0.4125 
LAST_RYD(-1) 0.308048 0.161393 1.908682 0.0598 
LAST_SAB(-1) -0.241410 0.081078 -2.977523 0.0038 
LAST_SIB(-1) -0.316347 0.118227 -2.675763 0.0090 
LAST_RJH(-1) 0.189620 0.094400 2.008680 0.0479 
LAST_BLD(-1) -0.736098 0.103118 -7.138387 0.0000 
RCA_SAM(-1) 0.082126 0.558142 0.147141 0.8834 
RCA_RYD(-1) -0.724942 0.889108 -0.815359 0.4173 
RCA_SAB(-1) -1.489424 0.448639 -3.319869 0.0014 
RCA_SIB(-1) -0.104803 0.255478 -0.410222 0.6827 
RCA_RJH(-1) -0.337315 0.825487 -0.408625 0.6839 
RCA_BLD(-1) 0.052518 0.281525 0.186549 0.8525 
RCI_SAM(-1) 0.032819 0.077780 0.421954 0.6742 
RCI_RYD(-1) 0.003192 0.066286 0.048155 0.9617 
RCI_SAB(-1) 0.097760 0.076668 1.275112 0.2059 
RCI_SIB(-1) -0.001052 0.002741 -0.383748 0.7022 
RCI_RJH(-1) -0.446947 0.097857 -4.567328 0.0000 
RCI_BLD(-1) 0.000331 0.000484 0.683699 0.4961 
IDV_SAM(-1) 0.101979 0.125921 0.809865 0.4204 
IDV_RYD(-1) -0.187360 0.161289 -1.161646 0.2488 
IDV_SAB(-1) 0.030768 0.111730 0.275374 0.7837 
IDV_SIB(-1) -0.166351 0.052959 -3.141103 0.0024 
IDV_RJH(-1) -0.163738 0.134712 -1.215464 0.2277 
IDV_BLD(-1) 0.066311 0.270120 0.245485 0.8067 
Fixed Effects 
(Cross)     
_SAM—C -0.652164    
_RYD—C -4.378241    
_SAB—C 1.614018    
_SIB—C 1.456042    
_RJH—C -3.141821    
_BLD—C 5.102171    
      Effects Specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
      Weighted Statistics   
     R-squared 0.996480     Mean dependent var 51.41742 
Adjusted R-squared 0.995089     S.D. dependent var 16.43169 
S.E. of regression 1.151517     Sum squared resid 107.4053 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.721575     Instrument rank 33.00000 
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           Figures 2.3: Double GLS-SUR Residuals of z-score model 
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                    Table 6.3: Residual Correlation Matrix by  
                                    Method Polled Double EGLS (SUR) 
 _SAM _RYD _SAB _SIB _RJH _BLD 
_SAM  1.00000 -0.10174  0.38804  0.71126  0.60867 -0.39921 
_RYD -0.10174  1.00000 -0.19183 -0.41726 -0.43326  0.46786 
_SAB  0.38804 -0.19183  1.00000  0.56992  0.06064  0.07292 
_SIB  0.71126 -0.41726  0.56992  1.00000  0.64901 -0.44848 
_RJH  0.60867 -0.43326  0.06064  0.64901  1.00000 -0.52516 
_BLD -0.39921  0.46786  0.07292 -0.44848 -0.52516  1. 00000 
 
 
                   Figures3.3: Panel Fixed Effects using 2GLS-SUR method 
-0.6522
-4.3782
1.6140
1.4560
-3.1418
5.1022
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
_SAM--C_2PLS_SUR
_RYD--C_2PLS_SUR
_SAB--C_2PLS_SUR
_SIB--C_2PLS_SUR
_RJH--C_2PLS_SUR
_BLD--C_2PLS_SUR
 
 
 
31 
 
                      Table 7.1:  Panel GLS Estimation of z-score model 
 
Dependent Variable: LZSCOR   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Sample (adjusted): 2005Q2 2009Q4  
Cross-sections included: 6   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 114  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Cross-section SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 386.8130 281.0306 1.376409 0.1717 
IBD -0.392953 0.095470 -4.115988 0.0001 
RCA(-1) 0.739478 0.128690 5.746217 0.0000 
RCI(-1) -0.000652 0.000605 -1.078293 0.2834 
LAST(-1) 0.217003 0.016059 13.51320 0.0000 
IDV(-1) -0.203617 0.050121 -4.062549 0.0001 
IDV_IBD(-1) 0.811252 0.167535 4.842288 0.0000 
LHHI(-1) -42.22516 30.76311 -1.372591 0.1729 
SHIB(-1) -66.66704 48.52463 -1.373880 0.1725 
INF(-1) -9.009449 1.575629 -5.718003 0.0000 
GRW(-1) -0.218694 0.111585 -1.959877 0.0527 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.996488     Mean dependent var 20.53343 
Adjusted R-squared 0.996147     S.D. dependent var 15.67960 
S.E. of regression 0.973223     Sum squared resid 97.55778 
F-statistic 2922.777     Durbin-Watson stat 0.829717 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
 
                    Figure 4.1: Standardized Residuals using Panel GLS method 
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                       Table 7.2:  Panel LS Estimation of z-score model 
Dependent Variable: LZSCOR   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 2005Q2 2009Q4  
Cross-sections included: 6   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 114  
Cross-section SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 649.9624 208.3885 3.118994 0.0024 
RCA(-1) 0.753470 0.233864 3.221823 0.0017 
RCI(-1) -0.000310 0.000923 -0.336332 0.7373 
IDV(-1) -0.318506 0.092603 -3.439492 0.0009 
LHHI(-1) -70.50640 22.79715 -3.092772 0.0026 
SHIB(-1) -110.8521 35.93047 -3.085184 0.0026 
LAST(-1) -0.226464 0.066587 -3.401041 0.0010 
IDV_IBD(-1) 0.205734 0.216097 0.952044 0.3434 
GRW(-1) -0.108187 0.083645 -1.293404 0.1989 
INF(-1) -4.017214 1.435829 -2.797836 0.0062 
     
 Effects Specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
R-squared 0.845383     Mean dependent var 3.745184 
Adjusted R-squared 0.823518     S.D. dependent var 0.296972 
S.E. of regression 0.124757     Akaike info criterion -1.202817 
Sum squared resid 1.540869     Schwarz criterion -0.842791 
Log likelihood 83.56055     F-statistic 38.66364 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.723910     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
   Tables 8.1: Cross-Section Fixed Effects  
        on z-score using Panel LS method  
CROSSID_Cste_Method Effect 
 SAM_C_Panel LS  0.406787 
 RYD_C_Panel LS  0.588175 
 SAB_C_Panel LS -0.061484 
 SIB_C_Panel LS -0.345498 
 RJH_C_Panel LS  0.048084 
 BLD_C_Panel LS -0.636063 
 
 
                    Figure 4.2: Standardized Residuals using Panel LS method 
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                                 Table 7.3:  Panel GLS Estimation of z-score model 
Dependent Variable: LZSCOR   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Sample (adjusted): 2005Q2 2009Q4  
Cross-sections included: 6   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 114  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Cross-section SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 518.6609 140.8547 3.682242 0.0004 
RCA(-1) 0.661983 0.053565 12.35854 0.0000 
RCI(-1) -0.000499 0.000284 -1.756318 0.0821 
IDV(-1) -0.278767 0.028729 -9.703381 0.0000 
LHHI(-1) -56.16464 15.41028 -3.644621 0.0004 
SHIB(-1) -87.79749 24.26524 -3.618241 0.0005 
LAST(-1) -0.209518 0.033495 -6.255232 0.0000 
IDV_IBD(-1) 0.309485 0.096961 3.191847 0.0019 
GRW(-1) -0.133255 0.056492 -2.358812 0.0203 
INF(-1) -3.341631 0.803610 -4.158273 0.0001 
     
 Effects Specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.999381     Mean dependent var 39.48141 
Adjusted R-squared 0.999294     S.D. dependent var 38.78086 
S.E. of regression 1.030454     Sum squared resid 105.1218 
F-statistic 11425.07     Durbin-Watson stat 1.309055 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
         Tables 8.2: Cross-Section Fixed Effects  
              on z-score using Panel GLS method  
CROSSID_Cste_Method Effect 
 SAM_C_PanelGLS  0.402613 
 RYD_C_PanelGLS  0.590647 
 SAB_C_PanelGLS -0.055532 
 SIB_C_PanelGLS -0.332961 
 RJH_C_Panel GLS  0.039923 
 BLD_C_PanelGLS -0.644689 
 
   Figure 4.3: Standardized Residuals using Panel GLS method 
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1This link “http://www.halal2.com/main.asp?id=71” specifies Islamic and non Islamic features of firms and 
banks registered in Saudi stock market. 
2
 The panel unit test is more sensible to high autocorrelation, which involves appropriate lag length in the test 
equation. The Hadri test has a different procedure for choosing the lag length; it requires the choice of kernel 
method estimation and bandwidth method to weighting the auto-covariances by selecting the small ones.  
3
 Strobel (2010) shows that the best measure of standard deviation require high frequency such the branch banks 
data.   
4
 In fact, insolvency is more serious and dangerous problem than liquidity, which means that the bank liabilities 
exceed its assets, or the bank become insolvent. A bank may become illiquid even when it is solvent, if its assets 
are held in illiquid assets (long term financial assets or real assets) that can only be liquidated at high cost. The 
bank may be forced to sell such assets at considerable loss, by selling it at lower than its nominal value. The 
concept of financial distress, widely used to make financial analysis of banks data, indicates the negative 
performance of banks. The case of financial distress occurs when the bank becomes insolvent even if bank 
assets exceed its liabilities. While the concept of economic failure shows that the return rate of investments is 
less than the interest rate on short loans. Also, the financial failure happens when the enterprise is unable to pay 
its debts and short-term obligations. The bankruptcy indicates the inability of a company to pay its debts and 
short-term obligations and the difficulty to manage their financial needs from external funding sources.   
5
 Instead of interest income (commissions) and interest charges in conventional banks, we use for Islamic banks 
finance income and finance charges.  
6
 To calculate the income diversity, we use the following definition: 
 where the net interest income, for Islamic banks, includes 
positive and negative income flows related to many model of PLS system. The higher value of this index 
indicates a higher diversification of income.   
7
 Such the Pooled Least Square (PLS) method, without cross-section weights and using standard errors and 
covariances; the Generalized Pooled Least Squares (PGLS) method, with cross-section weights (correcting for 
both cross-section heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation) and using SUR errors and covariances; 
the P2GLS method, with cross-section weights and using SUR errors and covariances, and set of common, 
cross-section specific and period specific instrumental variables.   
8 Obviously, when we consider panel banks, the fixed effects are less appropriate than the stochastic effects, but 
the small number of banks in our sample does not authorize such hypothesis.     
